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Regulation  and Differences  in Financial  Institutions 
Victoria  Chick 
and 
Sheila C. Dow 
Some regulation of  financial markets is accepted even in these dirigiste times 
and even by those neoclassical economists  who find it a struggle to explain why the 
market  for money is different  from the market  for peanuts. 
Monetary regulation as defined in this paper has three parts: the legal frame- 
work, monetary  policy, and the supervision  of banking  and financial markets. His- 
torically, these roles have developed alongside the systems they regulated, new 
measures  being created  by the monetary  authorities-or  even by large private banks- 
as  specific problems presented themselves. Within this evolutionary framework, 
policies were tailored to the institutions  as they existed at the time. Thus, when 
banks provided  only a minor proportion  of monetary  instruments,  prudential  regula- 
tion was left to the banks themselves and caveat depositor. When bank-issued  notes 
began to create what we would now describe  as macroeconomic  instability,  the gov- 
ernment/monetary  authority  took over the issue of notes. When bank credit and de- 
posits became a force to reckon with, the authorities  devised such instruments  as 
reserve or liquid asset requirements  and, where the development  of securities mar- 
kets allowed it, open market  operations  to keep the banks on a short lead. Each of 
these episodes marks a shift in the power to provide money, first away from the 
state to the private sector, then back again as the state regains control. The current 
situation, almost everywhere in the developed world, is that the power to create 
money lies almost entirely  with the private  sector. 
The current  situation  in the European  Union (EU) bears some similarities  to the 
situation at the time of the institution  of the Federal Reserve System, which, of 
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course, came on the scene after a common currency  was already  in place but when 
communications  were slow and there  were distinct  differences  in the regional  econo- 
mies of the United States. These differences were the reason for the federal struc- 
ture of the Federal Reserve System, with each Federal Reserve Bank having the 
power to operate  interest  rate policy according  to local needs. The great diversity of 
state legal frameworks  under  which banks  were chartered  and regulated,  and the di- 
versity of banks in terms of their size,  their branching, and their local situation, 
gave rise to differential  reserve requirements  and discretionary  lending through  the 
discount  window, which could make allowances for these individual  circumstances. 
While the diversity in the EU is similar, the regulatory  response  is markedly  dif- 
ferent: a  new  legal  framework, a  centralized monetary policy,  and supervisory 
mechanisms are being deliberately designed in the context of projected economic 
and monetary union (EMU) with a common currency. When common currencies 
were put in place in former times, the monetary  institutions  were few and simple. 
One would have thought  that the architects  of Europe's new system would confront 
the fact that well-elaborated institutions are in place in every member country, 
which vary very considerably  in a number  of important  respects. Instead, the new 
grand design is informed by a powerful set of monetarist  and neoclassical assump- 
tions that give little recognition to the institutional  structure  of European  banking 
and finance. 
As seen by the governing bodies of the EU and by the European  Monetary  Insti- 
tute, whose job it is to prepare  the groundwork  for stage three of monetary  union, 
the legal framework defines institutions and provides certain safeguards, such as 
capital adequacy  rules and deposit insurance,  which will be uniform  in application. 
The governing idea is  that this uniformity will  create a  "level playing field" for 
competition, along the same lines as other areas of EU activity (i.e.,  money is being 
treated  in the same way as peanuts  in this respect), and that the competition  among 
financial  institutions  that  will ensue, and the results of that  competition,  are no busi- 
ness of the authorities. 
The EU understands  the central purpose of monetary  policy to be the contain- 
ment of inflation. This will be the job of the independent  European  System of Cen- 
tral Banks (ESCB), whose framework  assumes that the member central banks are 
able to control their money supplies. Furthermore,  it is believed that so-called eco- 
nomic policy can be divorced from monetary  policy and subject to the principle of 
subsidiarity,  while the ESCB is responsible  for monetary  policy. No explicit mecha- 
nisms for coordination  of  "economic"  policies are proposed, although the need is 
recognized. 
The question of bank supervision  gets barely a mention  in the Maastricht  Treaty. 
It is seen as separable  from the issue of monetary  control. And yet there are plans 
for deposit insurance,  and one hopes that the ESCB will, at least in extremis,  be pre- 
pared to act as lender of last resort. To separate  these matters  is bizarre and irre- Regulation  and Differences in Financial Institutions  519 
sponsible. There is little excuse, after the extensive debates  on moral hazard  and de- 
posit insurance  that  have taken  place in the economics literature. 
The assumptions behind these propositions are recognizable: the neoclassical 
faith that competition will always throw up the best result; the monetarist  beliefs 
that central banks can control the money supply, that this control is necessary and 
sufficient to defeat inflation, and that low inflation  is necessary for growth; and the 
Hayekian belief that government  intervention  is inimical to monetary  control. The 
origin of the idea that monetary  and "economic"  policies (i.e.,  fiscal policies) could 
be kept separate  is a legacy, oddly enough, of "bastard"  Keynesianism. 
Many criticisms can be made of  these assumptions  and the policies based on 
them. Most important  perhaps  is the deflationary  bias they impose, but this has been 
much commented  upon. Here we wish instead to address  the issue of the suitability 
of these assumptions  to the reality of European  financial  institutions  and some of the 
likely effects of the future  shape  of those institutions. 
Features of EU Monetary  Institutions 
European  banking and financial institutions  differ greatly in both the degree of 
their development and their direction. The extent of the use of bank liabilities as 
money is the hallmark  of "stage  two," when the banking  system can create credit in- 
dependently  of saving [Chick 1986]. According to the statistics for 1991-93 [Inter- 
national Financial Statistics 1995], the ratio of cash to demand  deposits (C/DD) in 
Greece is 83.5 percent. On this crude indicator, Greece may still be a cash econ- 
omy. Yet Greece has the largest number  of bank  branches  per capita  in Europe!  The 
C/DD ratio of the next highest cash user, Ireland,  is only 43.1 percent. At the other 
extreme is the United Kingdom,  with a C/DD ratio of 7.5 percent. 
The different direction of development  is most marked  in the contrast  between 
the United Kingdom  and Germany  not just in the matter  of universal  versus special- 
ized banking, which everybody knows, but in the unification  of retail and commer- 
cial business in the United Kingdom  and the dual banking system in Germany, in 
which industry  and commerce  are served by the universal  banks and "the  public"  by 
savings and cooperative banks. These latter gather mainly savings, which mark 
them as  "stage one"; a surprisingly  large percentage  of everyday transactions  are 
done with cash. In other words, one tier of banks is highly evolved and the popular 
tier far less so. Those countries  that manage  payments  through  the Post Office Giro 
are, on the criterion set for stage two,  in an earlier stage of  development, even 
though  the system is very sophisticated. 
As measured  by the proportion  of the national  market  captured  by the top five 
banks, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, and Germany are low-concentration 
countries, but this perception  is distorted  by foreign  banks in the first two and 4,000 
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show high concentration  (in ascending order, with the top five banks in Holland 
capturing  84 percent  of the market)  [Price Waterhouse  1988]. 
European  commercial  banks  are supplemented  in each country  by a variety of in- 
stitutions: building societies and other mutual or cooperative banks, rural/agricul- 
tural banks, and the like. They vary in the composition  of ownership, measured  by 
the percentage of assets: only 6.8 percent of Portuguese  bank assets are in private, 
non-foreign, non-mutual  banks compared  to 61 percent in Ireland  and the Nether- 
lands. Public ownership dominates in Portugal (87 percent), Greece (84 percent), 
and Italy (68 percent), and 53 percent of assets are foreign-owned in the United 
Kingdom [Gardener  and Molyneux 1993, 21]. 
Evaluation 
A legal framework  that imposes uniform  definitions  on European  financial  insti- 
tutions is bound to create a Procrustean  bed. There are problems  both in cross-coun- 
try comparisons and with the evolving structure  of the financial system within a 
country over time. Britain had to face the question of defining a bank-for the first 
time in its long history of banking-just at a time when the demarcations  between 
banks, building societies, securities dealers, and insurance  companies  were becom- 
ing blurred. Market segmentation  has perhaps broken down less rapidly in other 
European  countries, but the competitive forces that  have been unleashed  will surely 
breach some of the existing borders, as happened  in the United Kingdom  after Com- 
petition and Credit  Control  in 1971. 
Further, to impose a legal framework  that only establishes a level playing field 
and leaves the rest to competition  is to abdicate  any responsibility  for shaping  the in- 
stitutional  framework  of the future  Europe. There is some presumption  that the pre- 
sent  diversity  will  be  homogenized by  competition, but  the  pattern of  the 
homogenized system, and the winners and losers, are hard to forecast [see Chick 
and Dow 1995 for an attempt].  As Steinherr  and Huveneers  [1992, 130] put it: 
Unfortunately, our knowledge about competing organisational  forms is far 
from what a scientist would call conjecture:  there are some partial  theoretical 
arguments  and there is some empirical  evidence. Taken  together  they still do 
not add up to scientific knowledge. In the end, only experience  will be able 
to tell and survival of the fittest will be the ultimate  proof. 
The European Commission, for one, appears to believe that the fittest are in 
some sense the best [EC 1990, 12], whereas scientists do not ally "fittest"  with "op- 
timum,"  nor should we. 
Almost certainly, any uniform legal framework  will favor large, money-market- 
center banks over banks with regional or other specialized constituencies, whose 
business does not "travel"  well. Regulation  and Differences in Financial Institutions  521 
A  monetary policy based on monetarist  assumptions  is painfully at odds with 
present-day monetary institutions almost throughout  Europe. As  is  well  known, 
monetarism  has attempted  to bring forward  to the present day a theoretical system 
developed in the time of commodity  money. During at least some of the era of com- 
modity money, the proposition  that government  was in charge of the money supply 
has at least some credibility.1 But it is impossible to sustain that simple belief in 
economies where the great preponderance  of money in the EU is created  by banks, 
not government. 
In credit money economies, the belief must be that  the money supply can be con- 
trolled by controlling the money base. But this requires that the base itself is con- 
trollable, that the causality  run from the base to the money supply, and that the ratio 
of reserves to deposits and of the public's preferences  for cash as a ratio to deposits 
be stable. These conditions  are unlikely to be met in a time of rapid financial inno- 
vation,  including off-balance-sheet activity, liability management, securitization, 
and derivatives trading. The Bank of England  gave up reserve ratios as an instru- 
ment of monetary  control in 1981 in recognition  of the inapplicability  of the reserve 
ratio to monetary  control in the context of contemporary  British  banking. While the 
central  problem in any one country  concerns the stability  of the ratios over time, the 
operation  of a uniform policy across Europe  must confront  the diversity of banking 
practices across Europe. Actual reserve ratios in 1991 varied across the EU from 
3.8 percent (United Kingdom)  to 32 percent (Portugal)  [International  Financial Sta- 
tistics 1992]. 
Another way of making the same point is that monetarism  never considers the 
role of bank credit, either in the generation  of the money supply or in fostering eco- 
nomic activity by lending for productive  purposes. This bias follows from the ar- 
chaic, commodity-money  origins of monetarism  and explains the entirely negative 
and restricted role money has in monetarist  thought. The negative evaluation of 
bank credit is  reinforced by the Ricardian  perspective of the Bundesbank,  which 
holds that investment  not financed  by saving-i.e.,  which is financed  by bank credit- 
is ipsofacto inflationary.  This contrasts  with Keynes, who recognized the inflation- 
ary consequences of  expanding economic activity but regarded it as a necessary 
by-product of the expansion process, and only "true  inflation"  was to be avoided. 
Whatever one's normative  evaluation, the preponderance  of bank credit in the op- 
eration of  the monetary systems of Europe is overwhelming. Whether or not the 
authorities  like this fact, the prospect for a monetary  policy that ignores it is not 
good. 
The expectation is that the interest rate will form the centerpiece of monetary 
policy: one interest rate for Europe. I referred  above to the position in the United 
States when the Federal Reserve was founded: regional economies were distinct 
then because of distance and poor communications.  They are as distinct in Europe 
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entirely by the newness of the single market  or by barriers  of language, custom, or 
currency, for regional differences in activity exist within nation-states.  Differential 
interest rates, which might encourage  growth in depressed  regions, are not available 
within individual  European  nations now, as they were in the United States  at the be- 
ginning of this century, because of today's rapid  communication.  Soon, with a com- 
mon currency and a common monetary  policy, differential  rates will not even be 
available to entire European  nations  that  might need their assistance. 
The single European  interest  rate envisaged  will be determined  only by the needs 
of the financial  centers of the most advanced  and internationally  connected  countries 
and will be inappropriate  to the needs of the slower-growing  countries  and the de- 
pressed regions throughout  the EU. 
The Impact of Interest  Rates 
Regional problems aside, the conception  of a monetary  policy based on "an"  in- 
terest rate is bound to have different effects in different  European  countries. Let us 
just take the example of Germany  and the United Kingdom. A study of household 
and business debt [Rowlatt 1995] has shown that Britain  is far more sensitive than 
Germany  to variations  in short-term  interest  rates. About 85 percent  of British  mort- 
gages carry variable  rates of interest, and about  67 percent  of British  households  are 
owner-occupiers, whereas Germany has the lowest rate of  owner-occupation  in 
Europe; mortgages in Germany represent  slightly more than 20 percent of house- 
hold debt and less than a quarter  of these are variable-rate  contracts.  The character 
of other household  debt is more difficult to assess, but Rowlatt  reckons that  some 77 
percent of all household debt carries  variable  rates, whereas the figure for Germany 
is less than  20 percent. Furthermore,  the level of household  debt in the United King- 
dom is the highest in Europe. 
Similarly, a higher proportion  of loans to companies  in the United Kingdom  than 
in Germany  carry short-term  interest  rates-82 percent  versus 20 percent-and  liabili- 
ties show the same pattern, with 47 percent of company liabilities carrying short- 
term rates in the United Kingdom and 15 percent in Germany. The conclusion has 
to be that the United Kingdom  is far more sensitive to variations  in short-term  inter- 
est rates, which will be the subject of monetary  policy, than is Germany. Rowlatt 
remarks that these dramatic differences are diminishing-the behavior in different 
countries  is converging-and  admittedly  I took the polar cases to make my point- but 
the conclusion that a single policy will ride roughshod  over institutional  differences 
that are not small is inescapable. Regulation  and Differences in Financial Institutions  523 
A Final Point 
There is one glaring omission in the above analysis that the EU plans also ig- 
nore: even if the diversity of European  banking  were not a problem, the big Euro- 
pean banks are playing a global game. The competitive struggle at the top of the 
range of European  banking is not confined to Europe, nor is European  monetary 
policy able to set an agenda, achieved by whatever policy instrument,  in isolation 
from the relations between the Euro, the dollar, and the yen and the opportunities 
open to Europe's world-class  banks  to evade policy actions. 
Notes 
1.  When there was free minting, the public could determine  the money supply. Similarly, the 
government  could not control, though of course they could influence, the inflows and out- 
flows of money through  foreign trade. 
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